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stitution,' to use his own words, 'to the fund of materials for the history of the Constitution, on which would be staked the happiness of a young people, great even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of liberty throughout the world.'"

Accompanying the text is a list of references, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of the United States, together with the amendments. There is a map of the United States at the close of the Revolution, facing a map of the United States of today. The book is generously illustrated.

There is always a necessity for looking forward to the new and the untried. A man's reach must exceed his grasp. But just now our Old World needs a new baptism in the faiths and principles which have made America great. Instead of trying to import new forms from nations more hopeless than we, the call unto us is to burnish our wills with a revival of religion, a religion of liberties, foreseen and provided for in the Convention of 1787.

STEP BY STEP

THE Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament was a conference of nations. The American Peace Society places at the head of its "Suggestions for a Governed World" the importance of instituting conferences of nations. The time is near at hand when we shall have a conference of all the nations. The Washington Conference made no provision for a future conference. The Washington Conference was a conference of a limited number of nations; but the Washington Conference was a step toward the more general conference and toward conferences to be held at stated intervals. The time is not far distant when there will be such conferences at stated intervals. Thus wags our old world along, step by step. It has always been thus, particularly in international relations. Progress has always been slow,—step by step. Mr. Root has recently discovered in that immortal source of wisdom, namely, Mother Goose, that "leg over leg the dog went to Dover." There is no other way for the dog to get himself to Dover or anywhere else. It was fitting that Mr. Root should call attention to this esoteric fact while conferring with the international jurists at The Hague, and later while serving with the delegates at the Washington Conference.

The Washington Conference was not everything that it might be; neither did it accomplish everything that needs to be accomplished. It did approve and adopt the following treaties and resolutions, which treaties and resolutions have been submitted by the President of the

United States to the Senate for advice and consent to their ratification. It is well to recall these accomplishments.

TREATIES

- (1) A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, limiting naval armaments.
- (2) A treaty between the same powers, in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.
- (3) A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, signed December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean.
- (4) Declaration accompanying the above Four-Power Treaty.
- (5) A treaty between the same four powers, supplementary to the above, signed February 6, 1922.
- (6) A treaty between all nine powers relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China.
- (7) A treaty between the nine powers relating to Chinese customs tariff.

RESOLUTIONS

- No. 1. Resolution for a commission of jurists to consider amendment of Laws of War.
- No. 2. Resolution limiting jurisdiction of commission of jurists provided in resolution No. 1.
- No. 3. Resolution regarding a board of reference for Far Eastern questions.
- No. 4. Resolution regarding extraterritoriality in China.
- No. 5. Resolution regarding foreign postal agencies in China.
- No. 6. Resolution regarding armed forces in China.
- No. 7. Resolution regarding radio stations in China and accompanying declarations.
- No. 8. Resolution regarding unification of railways in China and accompanying declaration by China.
- No. 9. Resolution regarding the reduction of Chinese military forces.
- No. 10. Resolution regarding existing commitments of China or with respect to China.
- No. 11. Resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, approved by all the powers, including China.
- No. 12. Resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, approved by all the powers other than China.

Just now treaties 3, 4, and 5, which together make up what is known as the Four-Power Treaty, are before the Senate. There is opposition to this Four-Power Treaty.

The opponents charge that it is a treaty of alliance. The opponents are mistaken. If it were a treaty of alliance, it would be defensive, offensive, or both. In any event, it could relate only to matters of war. This is the interpretation of an alliance taken by practically all of the writers on international law since the time of Grotius. An alliance carries with it the sanction of force. The Four-Power Treaty makes no provision for force, directly or indirectly. This fact appears from the wording of the treaty. It was so specifically stated by Mr. Lodge in presenting the treaty, a statement which

has not been questioned by any of the powers concerned. But assurance upon this point is made doubly sure by the Brandegee reservation, recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, to wit:

"The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of this treaty there is no commitment of armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense."

It is charged that the Four-Power Pact is a League of Nations in disguise. If it were, there could be none of this opposition to it among the Wilson Democrats. But it is not a League of Nations. A League of Nations has come to mean an international organization made up of an Assembly, a Council, and a paid Secretariat, bodies with wide optional jurisdiction in legislative, judicial, and executive matters of foreign policy. Nothing of such things appears in this treaty. The Four-Power Pact provides for four things: a joint conference in case of a serious controversy arising out of the Pacific; communication between the four contracting parties in case of threat from an outside power; assurance that the treaty shall remain in force for ten years; the termination of the British-Japanese alliance of July 13, 1911. No one of these provisions provides for a League of Nations; all of them together could not constitute a League of Nations. The treaty is a step in the direction of peaceable settlement in case of a threat of war in the Pacific.

It is charged that the Four-Power Pact simply transfers the grouping system, the balance-of-power theory, from the Old World to the Pacific Ocean, for it is inevitable that this proposed group of the United States, France, England, and Japan will give rise to an opposing group. In other words, that it is simply a plan to perpetuate conditions which have produced the wars of history. If this were an alliance like unto the European alliances, the charge would be justified and the Senate should refuse to ratify. If the four nations concerned were contiguous, in intimate daily contact across artificial boundaries, with an infinite variety of contacts and rivalries, within easy striking distance of each other, jealous, fearful, hateful; did the treaty contain provisions for the division of empires, the grabbing of territory, the control by force of arms of an enemy's seaport town or coal areas, the exploitation of distant islands, and the annihilation of rights in various parts of the world, alliance or no alliance, league or no league, the treaty would mean the stirring up of ill will, of fears, of hatreds, and of revenge, tempers which are at the basis of all wars. Under such circumstances the treaty should fail. But as a matter of fact the circumstances are quite different. None of these things can be read into the treaty. This treaty is a step away from group

interests and towards those common understandings which only conferences can achieve.

It is charged that the treaty carries with it an obligation to interfere in quarrels between other nations. Mr. Borah does not say that this is provided for directly, but that under certain circumstances we may be morally obliged to do just that. Mr. Borah is right. Circumstances may arise when the United States may wish to interfere with some other nation. This treaty, however, does not make such a contingency more possible; quite the contrary.

Mr. Borah has intimated that he would approve article 2 of the treaty if it referred to *unprovoked* "aggressive action of any other power" instead of just "aggressive action," and if it referred to *peaceful* "measures to be taken" instead of just plain "measures to be taken." When we recall that this treaty was drawn not as a war measure, but as a peace measure, "with a view to the preservation of the general peace," we are reminded of what the *New York Evening Post* calls "gibbling grammarians." Mr. Borah believes in international conferences. He favors "a conference with any nation in the world whenever a controversy arises between that nation and the United States." But with whom the United States shall sit in conference "ought not to be determined in advance of the exigency, but ought to be determined at the time, because then we shall be free to sit upon either side, where we think justice is." Mr. Borah is here on good American ground. We agree with him perfectly. But our own view is that the problems of the Pacific are now so interrelated that any international problem of one Pacific nation is, because of the interdependence of all, a problem for all. In case of controversy in the Pacific, the United States will be concerned. It will have responsibilities; it will have to act. This treaty is a step toward intelligent action and, therefore, a step toward peaceable settlement. Nothing in this treaty precludes conference with nations other than Great Britain, France, and Japan. If the treaty be adopted, we can sit in conference with China, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, or any power whatsoever, quite as if there were no treaty. Furthermore, if Great Britain, or France, or Japan, in a given controversy, should, in our judgment, be in the wrong, our interests, our honor, our conceptions of justice and morality, would not be jeopardized by a conference. The conference would be a step away from such a hazard.

The Four-Power Treaty, at this writing, occupies the center of the stage. It was signed by the delegates one month after the opening of the conference, a first essential step to the work that was to follow. But all of the treaties and resolutions are before the Senate. Collectively, if ratified, they will constitute a most significant

step toward better international relations. To be sure, these treaties and resolutions relate to a comparatively narrow group of problems. In our judgment, they are for that reason the more hopeful. Conceived in an atmosphere of peace, they substitute more of reason and good will and less of military force in the Pacific. Already there is less talk of war with Japan, of killing generally, of the idiotic naval rivalry between the United States and Great Britain. Already the tension between Japan and China is lessened. The rapacious interests are less offensive in their attitude toward China. In the language of Mr. Hoover, the Washington Conference stands as the "first precise and substantial contribution in history to the problem of disarmament." The first treaty not only provides for the limitation of naval armaments, the abandonment of capital ship-building programs, but, perhaps most significant of all, the five great naval powers of the world have agreed upon a ratio of naval strength—the United States, 5; Great Britain, 5; Japan, 3; France, 1.75; Italy, 1.75. It seems reasonable to expect that as soon as world affairs are more stable these figures can be divided by a common divisor to the still further economic relief of the peoples. Already England, France, Japan, and the United States have reduced military preparations. If under the old diplomacy we had "legitimate spheres of interest" leading to exploitation, agreements and alliances ending in war; defensive adjustments becoming offensive and belligerent; exploitations in China, these treaties and resolutions constitute a step away from such things. There is nothing in these treaties and resolutions limiting any freedom or legitimate aspiration of America. Rear-Admiral Bradley Fiske protests "against the idea . . . that the conference has brought about a condition of affairs such as will insure permanent peace." The Rear-Admiral may be right. The Prime Minister of Great Britain speaks of the conference as "one of the greatest achievements for peace that has ever been registered in the history of the world." Lloyd-George may be wrong. But the Washington Conference represents a step in advance.

Why not step by step? Senator Reed renders no service to his reputation by calling the treaty "a farce." The men who drew it might have done a better job; but they are mature men and experienced withal. Their work is not a farce. These men have shown us a safe step toward the peace-goal of nations. Let us be comforted by our inspiring classic:

"Leg over leg

As the dog went to Dover,

When he came to a stile

Jump he went over."

THE PERSISTING WICKEDNESS

THE OLD WORLD has not wholly reformed. Things have not entirely changed as a result of the war. This is the fact. It is well to recognize the fact, for evidences of it are plentiful.

Under date of February 6, France and Poland signed a commercial treaty in Paris with the result, among other things, that France and Poland are now in an alliance to assist each other economically and in a military sense. Neither will conclude any political agreement in central or eastern Europe without consulting the other. It has all the appearance of the old Franco-Russian alliance brought up-to-date and for practically the same purpose.

All is not well with the League of Nations. Member States are not paying their contributions toward the expenses of that organization, particularly South and Central American States. It is believed that this failure on the part of American States is due not to their inability to pay, but to their unwillingness. This should occasion no surprise to friends of the League, for it has been inevitable since the United States refused to join that the other American States would soon withdraw. Then, too, the Supreme Council treats the Council of the League with more or less contempt. Riding over the League's Council, it itself goes about the business of executing peace treaties and organizing the Genoa Conference on the economic rehabilitation of Europe in a manner quite as cavalier as at the time of the Brussels economic conference of October, 1920. The Council of the League has discovered that it is powerless to bind governments; indeed, its offer of mediation and intervention in the case of Poland and Lithuania over a matter of elections to the Vilna Diet in the latter country has been rejected. When Russia violated the Treaty of Dorpat the Council of the League found itself unable to assist the people of east Karelia in Finland. The Council has proved impotent in the case of Germany's protest against the findings of the Saar Commission. Information such as we are able to receive from Geneva indicates that the Council of the League is despondent.

More serious than any of these things, we are disturbed for the success of the International Court of Justice, now in session at The Hague. At the present there is no chance of the United States becoming a member of the court. But still more distressing, the probabilities that the nations will make any general use of the court are meager, for the reason that, as it exists, the court differs from the court of arbitration already in existence at The Hague in one respect only, namely, that it has a permanent bench. In the absence of compulsory jurisdiction, there is every prospect that the International Court of Justice will remain impotent, with